This paper utilises a political lens in considering the cause for the production of corruption and the role of political leadership. Specifically, the notion of personalisation of power as advocated by Slater (2003) is adopted to portray how the adoption of neoliberalism ideology by an aspiring autocratic leader results in the weakening of the infrastructural power through three strategies: packing, rigging and circumventing. We use Perwaja Steel as a case study to demonstrate the modus operandi of corruption in a state-owned enterprise in Malaysia.
Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production of corruption
Introduction
Malaysia is often quoted as a good example of a successful moderate Islamic country (Borneopost, 28 June 2012) . It is ranked as the "37 th best country in the world and among the top three Asian countries in the global standing" for doing business (The Staronline, 21 August 2010), and is also a world leader for Islamic finance. Despite its impressive achievements, there are increasing underlying concerns over the last two decades on the growth and persistence of corruption in the country, which is not only destroying its international reputation as a safe and equitable environment for investment but also
immensely harming the quality of life of its people (Ibrahim, 2013) . According to the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission, prosecution of corruption cases in the form of bribery, malpractices, abuse of power, criminal breach of trust, and misappropriation of funds has increased to 520 cases during 2011 as compared to 432 cases in 2010 (MACC, 2012) . In fact, Malaysia is ranked fifth (after China, Russia, Mexico, and India) among the top 10 countries for illicit capital flight, accounting for almost 40.3 percent of cumulative illicit financial flows from developing countries between 2003 to 2012 and ranked third (after China and India) among Asian countries in exporting illicit capital to rich countries (Global Financial Integrity, 2014) . In spite of the major reforms in curbing corruption being launched by the past and current governments, it has continued to slide down in the Corruption
Perceptions Index (CPI) 1 ranking from 36 th position in 2011 to 50 th in 2014 (Global Financial Integrity, 2014) . When Malaysia gained independence in 1957, corruption was hardly an issue but has grown since the 1970s. Furthermore, as an Islamic country with Muslim leadership, Malaysia is expected to be clean from corruption as Islam strongly forbids and condemns such malpractices. It is mentioned in the Hadith: "God cursed the one who pays a bribe, the one who takes it and the mediator between the two" (Sahih Muslim) 3 and in the Quran (11:85):
"And O my people! Give full measure and weight in justice and reduce not the things that are due to the people, and do not commit mischief in the land, causing corruption." The question that arises is why corruption continues to grow and in fact, escalating to bigger scales in the country in recent years?
The extant literature on corruption has acknowledged that it is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, as it exhibits different forms and functions in diverse contexts, with multiple causes and effects (Brooks, Walsh, Lewis and Kim, 2013) . Nevertheless, there is mutual agreement that it entails the abuse of public power, roles or resources for private benefit (Amundsen, 1999; Johnston, 2005) , which may exist at the interface between public and private sectors (Rose-Ackerman, 1978) or between international actors and host countries (see e.g. Rose-Ackerman 1999; Bayart et al., 1999) . One strand of studies in this area is on identifying the root causes and the appropriate preventive measures that can be taken. 4 Discussion on the causes of corruption, which can be attributed to individuals, organizations, and institutions, has been grouped in the literature as either the demand-side (referring to the taking) or the supply-side (referring to the giving) of corruption (Heimann and Boswell, 1998; Sikka & Lehman, 2015) . This strand of literature further classified the preventive solutions into control (aimed at improving legal, electoral, educational and other institutional systems), exit (alternatives or substitutes available to actors in exiting the situation) and voice (respecting a wide array of perspectives, desires, and forms of practical knowledge) strategies (see Everett, Neu & Rahaman, 2006; 2007) . These studies rightly acknowledged that this global problem and its subsequent solution will always be debatable as the field's actors view the problem in different ways due to differences in the ''idiomatic, epistemological, ontological and moral correspondences'' (Rose and Miller, 1992; p. 179) .
In this paper, we seek to contribute to the debate on corruption using the lens of political power. We argue that the personalisation of power (Slater, 2003) by the political leadership imbued with neoliberalism ideology induced the production of corruption. Using one of the largest financial scandals in a state-owned enterprise during the premiership of Mahathir Mohamad as a case study, we provide evidence on how an aspired autocratic leadership managed to personalised power and weakened the infrastructural apparatus that provides the necessary check and balance. This, in turn, facilitated the production of corruption on both the demand and supply side.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the notion of personalisation of power and mechanisms of personalisation that can be utilised in transforming a democratic system into an autocratic regime as well as explain how the adoption of neoliberalism ideology may further facilitate the production of corruption.
Section 3 presents the case study and discusses the modus operandi of the production of corruption, as well as the roles of the various actors. The last section concludes the paper with some reflections and suggestions for further research.
Personalisation of power, neoliberalism and the production of corruption
The fundamental purpose of any democratic institutions is to provide stable patterns of popular representation. According to Mann (1988, p.5) , one way this can be achieved is by constraining the chief executive's 'despotic power', referring to the range of actions that an individual leader is empowered to take without routine, institutionalized negotiations with other regime members (i.e. the power to decide). The raison d'etre in authoritarian institutions is to supply a regime with the 'infrastructural power' (i.e. the power to govern) which is necessary if command over potential opposition in civil society and within the multiple layers of the state apparatus itself is to be implemented. In other words, while democratic institutions serve to keep the chief executive in check, authoritarian institutions serve to keep the opponents under wraps (Mann, 1988) . According to Slater (2003) , in semi democratic regimes, personalisation of power by any aspiring autocrat requires high levels of infiltration into infrastructural powers in order to command the whole country. Three mechanisms that can be utilised by the aspiring autocrat to personalise his/her power include:
packing, through commandeering the power of an existing institution for personal purposes;
rigging, through the strategic modification of institutional rules and procedures to forestall competition for leadership positions; and circumventing through either the creation of entirely new organizations or demand for existing organizations to take on entirely new tasks which implies the squandering of at least a portion of a regime's institutional inheritance (Slater, 2003; p.91) . This process is further made possible in such regimes through the adoption of neoliberalism.
Historically, neoliberalism ideologies as championed by Keynes were associated with the role of the state in constraining the mobility of capital and in redistributing wealth for a more equitable and just society (Sikka, 2015) . However, over time, the idea of the control of capital by the state was challenged by Hayek (1944) who argues that market prosperity, stability and social justice can be achieved through free market and minimum state intervention while still providing minimum provision to those who cannot earn a living in the market (Tebble, 2010 (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) .
The embracement of neoliberalism ideologies by western powers is not only confined in their own territories but also exported to other developing countries through foreign direct investments (Sikka, 2015) and other tools deemed necessary for modernising their economies. The neoliberalists have managed to convince the political elites in developing countries "that the system is natural, fair and fundamentally better than any realistic alternative" (Sklair, 1995; p.98) , which in turn either directly or indirectly made them to believe in their own inferior socio-political and economic setting as compared to advanced nations. This inferiority complex results in political elites in developing countries to voluntarily embrace the structures and values of their western counterparts, as opposed to other alternatives that may be more suitable in fulfilling local needs, and may also be motivated by the obvious private rewards that can be gained through close relationship with business elites who needed them in order to survive in the competitive market. This symbiotic relationship led to the state becoming nothing more than a façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations, clientelism (including nepotism and cronyism), and political corruption (Hope and Chikulo 2000; Chabal and Daloz 1999) .
Adoption of neoliberalism weakened the distinction between public and private which dominates the politics of some countries, especially in Africa and some parts of South-East Asia.
Unlike neoliberalist political leaders in democratic countries who are subject to public scrutiny if their style of reconfiguring the resources may have negative impact on society, their counterparts in developing countries may use mechanisms of personalisation of power to silence their opponents and critics especially when there is a lack or weakened infrastructural power (public and legal institutions).
Another outcome of the adoption of neoliberalism is crony capitalism, a system where significant parts of the economy are controlled by the government and political elites who will use the power of the state to make decisions in the best interests of a particular set of well-connected businesses, rather than in the best interest of the market as a whole (Girling, 1997; Chang, 1998; Krugman, 1998; Wade, 1998; Haber, 2002 (Phillips, 2004) or kleptocracy, where the political elites seek to increase their personal wealth often in the pretence of providing honest service to the society i.e. corruption rule by theft (Bush, 2006) . While both plutocracy and kleptocracy seem to favour the political elites, their closeness with business corporations including accounting firms, intensify the production of corruption.
The Malaysian context
Malaysian politics has been dominated by the National Front or Barisan Nasional ( under six premierships 6 including the present one. However, it was Mahathir's twenty two years of premiership that has significantly transformed Malaysian political and socioeconomic landscape that persists till the present day. According to Gomez and Jomo (1999) , the neoliberal policies and discourses that assist in wealth accumulation and concentration through political patronage intensified during Mahathir's administration. When he came into power in 1981 7 , he was inspired by the success of the four Asian Tigers or Asian Dragons group; in fact it actually widened social inequality (Gomez and Jomo, 1999) . Other reports highlighted that Malaysia's level of inequality was among the highest reported in the region, with a Gini coefficient 10 of 0.49 during 2000 (Netto, 2004) , while at the same time the rich are getting richer in Malaysia. The widespread poverty in Malay dominated states caused some UMNO supporters to question the policies that focused on privatisation and heavy industries run by favoured businessmen (Saw and Kesavapany, 2006) , including those with family and friendship ties. To ease the friction, the ruling party created a 'new middle-class'
Malay professionals (Rahman, 2002) and this frustrated some of the Malay elite groups who monopolised most of the country's concessions or rents, causing them to switch their loyalty from UMNO to the opposition party, the Parti Keadilan Rakyat (Malaysian Justice Party) led by Anwar Ibrahim.
11
From 1985 onwards, business regulation for inter-ethnic redistribution purposes as required under the NEP and the Industrial Coordination Act 1975, was abandoned. This further intensification of political patronage with certain bumiputra and non-bumiputra businessmen do not only brought mutual benefits to the two groups but also seen as important for the development of business interest (Gomez and Jomo, 1999) . When the first recession hit in 1985-1987, many Malaysian corporations, especially those associated with the regime's 'cronies', were very highly leveraged but they were protected and supported through government bailouts to ensure that Mahathir achieved his goals of making Malaysia a fullydeveloped industrial country through his Vision 2020 policy (Gomez and Jomo, 1999) .
When the 1997 financial crisis erupted, Mahathir was once again anxious to protect and organize bail-outs for the cronies, which led critics to charge that the regime's cronies were doubly blessed -first by benefiting from privatization in the 1980s, and then by walking away unscathed from their debts and liabilities through bail-outs using public funds (Jomo, 2003) . Mahathir also has an obsession for mega-projects and it was during his time that the Petronas Twin Towers, KLIA, Putrajaya and Sepang Grand Prix Circuit were developed.
Critics at that time expressed doubts that the country's resources had been put to the best and most productive use and some economists were concerned on the financial implications (huge government debts) and depleted natural resources for the next generation of Malaysians (Netto, 1999) as a result of these mega ventures.
In short, under Mahathir, Malaysia experienced 20 years of privatizing profits and profitable assets and socializing of losses and liabilities (Jomo, 2003) . The perpetrators were not made accountable and overly protected which may be attributed to the personalization of power by the leadership. Leong (1992, p. 243) commented that "… under the Mahathir administration, the Cabinet is no longer used as a forum, but rather as a rubber-stamp institution that gives legitimacy to government policies." Similarly, Leigh (2001, p.7) succinctly commented:
"…the most enduring consequence of the Mahathir era has been a deliberate and decisive weakening of Malaysia's institutions, including the judiciary, the royalty, the independent civil service, the parliament, the electoral system and....The institutions of governance are much weaker, and rulership has been personalized."
The personalisation of power was achieved by packing the most important posts in the cabinet and institutional infrastructure with loyalists, and he himself subsuming another two vital posts, home minister and finance minister in 1998. Rigging of the political party's procedures facilitated his personal domination of the hegemonic political organization (Slater, 2003) and in centralising the ruling party's power in a few executives' hands (Gomez, 2004; Saw and Kesavapany, 2006) . Circumvention was used in silencing and later ousting the then Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, who had opposed to bail-outs using public funds. 12 He appointed Daim as the 'virtual finance minister' (Erickson and Shameen, 1998) and also allowed himself direct control over a variety of discretionary funds to prepare strategic bailouts for his key allies in the corporate sector (Slater, 2003) .
In the next section we present a case as evidence on how neoliberalism ideology and personalisation of power by a political leader facilitated the production of corruption in a state-owned enterprise. The research was conducted through scrutinizing newspaper articles, website commentaries, books and journal articles related to the company and major actors.
Although there are other scandals involving state-owned companies in Malaysia, we chose Perwaja Steel as our case as it was one of the largest scandals at a time when personalisation of power had just started to develop.
Production of corruption in Perwaja Steel

Company background
Perwaja Terengganu was formed on 22 April 1982 with a paid up capital of RM 250 million as a joint-venture between the government agency, Heavy Industries Corporation of Malaysia (Hicom Ltd) and Nippon Steel Corp. 13 The project was meant to be the crowning jewel of the industrialization drive under Mahathir's Look East policy. The Japanese company built a billet-making plant and a direct-reduction facility to smelt ore into hot briquetted iron based on a new technology. The direct-reduction plant never functioned properly and by 1986, the joint-venture project accumulated losses of RM 131 million. This was attributed to management problems and appreciation of the Japanese yen which affected its interest payments on a yen loan totaling RM 815 million (The Malay Mail, 10 February 2004) . In 12 Mahathir and Daim instructed the Finance Minister, Anwar Ibrahim to suspend KLSE rules to allow the leading crony UEM-Renong conglomerate a bailout. That move caused the stock market capitalization to fall by RM 70 billion, or 20 percent, in three days in November 1997 (Jomo, 2003) . These policy divergences between Mahathir and Anwar had caused the latter a heavy price. In 1998, Anwar was imprisoned for five years on sodomy allegation. Staronline, June 25, 2008) . 15 UMNO is a major shareholder of the bank. 16 In an interview after being released from conviction, he revealed that he had received a letter from a senior official asking him to resign due to ill health. (News Straits Times, 28 March 2003) . showing many signs of failure, he kept injecting more public funds into the 'pet' project as he perceive it as too important to fail to safe his ego and also to ward off increasing criticisms from his opponents. He turned to neoliberalist cronies for advice and support and in return promised protecting their interests by utilizing the infrastructural power. This supports the arguments by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) and Sikka (2015) that neoliberalism ideology legitimises competitive beings to indulge in endless pursuit as sign of success.
Deployment of power and production of corruption
Although the ACA's probe on Perwaja Steel started in 1996, no one had been implicated until 
Money transferred back
This suggests that Mahathir has succeeded in personalising his power by diverting decisionmaking authority on major policy issues to the Prime Minister's Department through utilising the packing and circumventing strategies in the case of the ACA and utilising the rigging strategy in determining his successors (i.e. Abdullah Badawi & also the current PM, Najib Razak) to ensure that he will not be implicated. During the court proceedings, the weak internal control system and the working of a covert power became more apparent. Figure 1 illustrates the main actors and their roles in the case. However, a pertinent question in all this is the rationale of a Japanese company (NKK) requesting payments for its services to be made to the bank account of its associate company (Frilsham) in Hong Kong rather than directly to it. The scandal worsened when NKK was later found to be non-existent (The Malay Mail, 10 February, 2004) Affandi and Zubir Embong. The board unanimously approved the procedure for the 18 He was a former engineer with Malaysian Telecommunication Department who retired in 1971 and started a family control company, Sapura Holdings, which bought UMW from Eric Chia. 19 The Circular: is a strict financial guideline which requires companies in which the Government owns at least 51% equity, to keep the MOF informed on projects, tenders, and purchases at the initial stage of negotiations. 20 The tender committee needs to approve all contracts or purchase of RM 15 million or above.
purchases and awards of contracts as directed by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) and proposal for the tendering committee. The board's chairman, Zainal Abidin Sulong, further reported that the board also approved Eric to conclude purchases and contracts without referring to the tendering committee for consumable goods like electrodes, scrap, iron ore, lubricants, etc., and any contracts of RM 5 million and below. Ironically, another former board director who was also the MOF's representative on the board, Nik Mohd Affandi Nik Yusoff, told the court that the MOF had never forced the company to activate its tendering committee and he also disagreed with some parts of the minutes of meeting which stated that the MOF had agreed to exempt the company from seeking approval for purchases and contracts of RM 15 million and above. These are not the comments of equal parties to a commercial transaction, (Thestaronline, 27 June 2007) .
Secondly, the conflicts in the tendering documents -the prosecution insisted that the TAA was free but when tendering its document at the trial, they stated the agreements would be The Perwaja Steel fraud case which dragged for 11 years (from 1996 until 2007) was indeed one of the country's longest investigations. The involvement of foreign institutions and powerful individuals was blamed for the case being dragged for so long. While this might be true due to the nature of the case, it may also be seen as a tactic used by the relevant parties as a massive cover up exercise hoping that people will forget about it with the passing of time (Grenfell, 1979) . Table 3 summarises the chronology of events on the role of Mahathir and his cronies in the production of corruption and how he used the state apparatus and his loyal cronies and other political elites to ensure he was never implicated nor referred to in the Perwaja Steel fiasco. 
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Eric was acquitted by the judge. The prosecution team failed to bring the key witnesses and produced conflicting documents causing the case to be dropped.
Reflections and conclusion
Combating corruption on both the demand and supply side requires understanding of the context and logic of the actors conducting the affairs in modern societies. In developing countries, economic policies and actions are often in the hands of the political elites and the doctrine of neoliberalism has been a convenient vehicle in legitimising their exercise of power in turning the state's assets into private enterprises and in deregulating economic activities, as well as in empowering themselves and their cronies in defending their decisions and outcomes. The main criticism on the symbiotic relationship between the political elites and business cronies is the excessive misuse of power to the degree that it corrupts the economic and political principles of public service (Sikka, 2008; Bakre, 2008) . Hence, any effort at curbing corruption requires scrutiny of the political ambition and democratic spirit of the 'tone at the top'. When a country is allowed to be run by an increasingly authoritarian personality without constraints on the despotic power, then the country's institutional infrastructure that provides the check and balance may be weakened by the aspiring autocrat through various means of personalisation of power (Slater, 2003) .
We demonstrate, using Perwaja Steel as a case study, how a political leader's form of by the current Prime Minister, Najib. All these scandals share the same modus operandi and if the root of the problem i.e. the autocratic leadership is not tackled, then corruption in the country will continue.
Our study is not without limitations. Firstly, we present an in-depth analysis of only one case study of a failed state-owned company in Malaysia. Future studies can adopt multiple-case study method to show the commonality and differences of the main actors, collaborators and institutions involved in the production of corruption. Secondly, our case study analysis relies on secondary data and future research may use interviews with members of political parties, lawyers, accountants, and this will provide better voices on the corruption problem. Thirdly, we did not discuss the preventive strategies suitable for the country and hence, future studies may consider this. Fourthly, as a multiracial and multi-religious nation, the underlying philosophical and ethical doctrines for conducting economic activities other than neoliberalism may be considered.
